نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 گروه مهندسی عمران گرایش منابع آب دانشگاه یاسوج، یاسوج، ایران.
2 گروه مهندسی محیطزیست گرایش آب و فاضلاب دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
In this thesis, in order to manage the quality of the river, a structure with the objectives of minimizing the environmental protection costs and providing the river water quality standard according to the implementation aspects of the policies is presented. After identifying the polluting sources in the studied area and grouping them, a number of sewage treatment scenarios were considered for each discharge group, and the cost related to each scenario was calculated.Considering the inherent errors and uncertainties in the estimation of treatment costs and penalty for violating water quality standards, a random method was created by combining decision-making approaches and the Monte Carlo simulation method to identify the best treatment scenarios.The decision-making approaches used to increase the implementation capability of pollution load trading programs and examine the desirability of dischargers include stochastic social choice rules (SSCR), stochastic fallback bargaining (SFB) and stochastic multi-criteria decision-making (SMCDM), each approach includes different methods. Finally, in order to reduce the costs and motivate the dischargers to voluntarily participate in the quality protection of the river, the best option by any approach based on the cost criteria, as the initial permission to discharge the pollution load into the optimization model, the extended trading-ratio system (ETRS).The results of the implementation of the proposed model show that according to the SSCR approach, the costs are reduced by 4/53 Percent and by the SFB approach, the costs are reduced by 1/73 Percent while providing a relative agreement between polluting sources. Also, based on the SMCDM approach, the costs are reduced by 24/5 Percent, but it is less acceptable in terms of polluting sources, because in addition to the optimal distribution of dissatisfaction among the beneficiaries, efforts are made to group the evacuees into one group. Become, that the dynamic state of power existing among groups in real conditions is not considered.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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